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'The Cement Industry in Kenya 
Kenya's cement industry consists of two firms, 
The Bamburi Portland Cement Company Limited with its factory 
at Bamburi.near Mombasa, and The East African Portland Cement 
Company limited with a factory at Athi River, South of Nairobi. 
Both are associate companies of large European concerns. 
The older of the two companies is the E.A. Portland 
Cement which was incorporated in 1933 and started operating a 
grinding plant on the basis of imported clinker in Nairobi 
shortly thereafter. In 1958, the company took up the 
production of cement from local raw materials in its new 
factory at Athi River. The factory uses the wet production 
method and operates a modern rotary kiln. It has an annual 
production capacity of 120,000 tons. 
The formation of the Bamburi Portland Cement Company Ltd., 
which before September 1st, 1966, was called British Portland 
Cement Company Ltd., was approved by special ordinance No.61 of 
1951? for the purpose of constructing, at Bamburi, a cement 
factory. The company commenced production in 1954, and sold 
during its first financial year 23,000 tons of cement. The 
first two shaft kilnsl) installed gave the factory an annual 
capacity of over 100,000 tons. Later, the capacity has been 
progressively increased. A third kiln was installed in 1955> 
shortly afterwards followed kiln no. four and five. The total 
capacity in 1958 was 350,000 tons. In 1961, a sixth shaft 
kiln was installed bringing the total capacit5r up to 
400,000 tons. The dry production method is used. The Company 
has a Subsidiary in Mauritius and Associate Companies in 
Tanzania and Reunion. Subsidiary and Associate Companies 
Operate storage and bagging plants. The Associate in Tanzania 
opened up a production unit last year at Wazo Hill near 
Bar Es Salaam with an initial production capacity of about 
150,000 tons p.a. 
L o ca tional Problems 
The governing factor for the location of cement 
industries is the supply of raw materials and especially of 
limestone which contributes about 80fo in -weight to the total 
raw material inputs. Most cement factories are, therefore, 
located in close neighbourhood to the lime quarries. This 
can also be observed in the case of the Bamburi factory. 
The factory is located in the middle of very large deposits 
of Pleistocene coral limestone and close to Jurassic shales. 
Also the gypsum which is added at a proportion of 3 to 5 
to the burnt ore is found not too far away at Roka, south 
of Malindi. The close vicinity to the main raw materials 
reduces the transport costs of them to the factory to a 
minimum. 
Shaft kilns are vertical kilns as opposed to rotary kilns. 
They are usually smaller than rotary kilns. 
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The Athi Riv^r factory, on the other hand, has to 
transport its requirements of limestone from Sultan Hamud 
where an unusually magnesia-low crystalline limestone is 
quarried1*'. Sultan Hamud is 64 miles by rail from Athi River, 
The railage, we can estimate, makes the production of Athi 
River cement about 8fo more expensive than the cement of 
a factory located in the immediate vicinity of its limestone 
quarries. It seems, therefore, that real or expected 
advantages in the form of closeness to the main market, more 
favorable climatic conditions, cheaper power through connection 
to the public net, more- sufficient supply of water, nearby 
deposits of calcrete (cunkar, an impure superficial' limestone 
which is used as secondary source of limestone) and closer 
location to the gypsum quarries around Garissa - the larger 
part of the gypsum supply of the factory comes from here 
being transported by road over a distance of about 220 miles 
to Athi River via Thika/Nairobi - have made the Athi River 
cement works one of the rare cases where a location for a 
cement plant has been chosen away from the limestone deposits. 
Production - Consumption - Exports 
Table I shows the development 
consumption of cement in Kenya and 
and interterritorial trade in cement. 
of 
the 
production and 
country's international 
Table I; Production, Exports, Imports and Consumption of Cement 
( 1000 tons ) 
Year Pro- Domestic Interterritorial Exports Net^) Local3) 
duction Exportsl) to Uganda to Tangany. Imports Consump-
+ Re-Exp. tion 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
1958 
1960 
1961 
1962 
1963 
1964 
1965 
236.1 
335.8 
324.3 
338.1 
338.3 
415.4 
476.2 
4.0 
42.4 
93-6 
103.9 
108.9 
171.4 
196.3 
8.3 
7-7 
6.5 
11.1 
16.8 
13.2 
7.1 
59-5 
104.7 
106. 5 
100.8 
97.0 
148. 6 
176.2 
7.6 
1 . 1 
0.7 
0.9 
0.8 
0.5 
0.0 
171.9 
182.1 
118.3 
123-2 
116. 4 
82.7 
96.6 
1) 
2) 
3) 
Sourcesi 
Outside East Africa 
From outside East Africa 
Local Consumption (7) = columns (2) - (3) - (4) - (5) +(6 ) 
East African Customs and Excise, Annual Trade Reports 
for trade figures; 
Statistics Division of the Kenya Ministry of Economic 
Planning and Development, Kenya Statistical Digest, 
Vol. I, No.l, Sept. 1963 and same author, Economic 
Survey 1966, p.46 for production figures. 
The estimates for local consumption disregard stock 
changes. 
1) W. Pulfrey, The Geology and 
Geological Survey of Kenya, 
Government Printer, Nairobi 
Mineral Resources of Kenya, 
Bulletin No.2, 
1960, p.21 
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The consumption of cement is closely related to the amount 
of "building and construction going on in the economy and this, 
in turn, depends on the level of investment in general. The 
preparations before independence to hand over the administration 
to Africans brought about a high degree of unsecurity among the 
business community which consisted - and consists today - nearly 
entirely of European and Asian firms. The result was a sharp 
drop in business investment and in new residential housing 
developments after 1960 and a parallel fall in the home consump-
tion of cement. The cement consumption, which from 1955 to 1960' 
had been rather stable between 170,000 and 190,000 tons per year, 
fell to 83,000 tons in 1964 which is less than 50$ of the 1960 
level. Only in 1965? there was a slow recovery of the Kenya 
cement market, a trend which has been more pronounced in 1966. 
The fluctuating cement sales are a rather good indicator of the 
development of the economy in general. The expectations for 
this year are also optimistic and indicate that the trough -in 
the economy immediately before and after Uhuru has been 
overcome and confidence restored. 
If we now look at the production figures since 1958, we 
get quite a different picture from the consumption sequence. 
The production of cement between 1958 and 1965 was more than 
doubled. As imports went from very small to virtually zero 
during the period under consideration, thus not significantly 
influencing the total picture, the diametrically different 
developments of cement production and home consumption must 
be entirely due to increased exports. The domestic exports 
outside East Africa as well as the interterritorial exports 
to Uganda and Tanganyika' increased by leaps and bounds. 
If we now .turn to Table II, we can see the regional 
distribution of the exports. Among the interterritorial 
exports Tanganyika is much more important as an importer of 
Kenya cement. This is easy to understand if we remember that 
Uganda has its own cement works at Tororo and restricts the 
imports of cement to about 10$ of its requirements. This is 
to protect the Tororo factory against competition from Kenya 
which would certainly be noticable taking into account the muoh 
better quality of the Athi River products and the unused 
capacity of this factory. Tanganyika, on the other hand, did 
not have its own cement factory until the middle of 1966 when 
the Tanganyika Cement Company Ltd. started production at its 
new factory at Wazo Hill, Between 1958 and 1963? the cement 
consumption fell also in Tanganyika, not as abruptly as in Kenya, 
though. Still, the Kenya sales to Tanganyika could be 
increased until 1961 by substituting imports from overseas which 
in 1958 amounted to about 70,000 tons. By 1965, imports into 
Tanganyika from overseas had dropped to preactically zero. 
After 1963, the Tanganyika cement market expanded rapidly, 
mainly as a result of the vigorous housing program of the 
Tanzania Government. Consequently, Kenya was able to increase 
its exports to Tanganyika between 1963 and 1965 by 82$. in weight 
Even faster than the interterritorial exports rose the 
exports of Kenya cement outside East Africa. The domestic 
exports increased continuously during the period from only 
4000 tons in 1958 to nearly 200,000 tons in 1965- An analysis 
of the direction of domestic exports shows that the islands in 
the Indian Ocean, especially Mauritius and Reunion, are the 
largest buyers. The Bamburi Cement Company has built up an 
outstanding sales organization to supply the markets on the 
islands and in the countries adjacent to the Indian Ocean. 
The transport to Mauritius and Reunion can be carried out in 
bulk by two Company-owned cement ships which reduces the 
transport costs to a minimum. The Subsidiary Company in 
Mauritius and the Associate in Reunion have both storage and 
bagging facilities. 
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nearby, "the unskilled part of its labour ferce is still rather 
inexpensive, tlie 'cechnical and aclministrational management 
is experienced and in constant contact to the world cement 
industry through the financial ties of the Company to two 
of the largest cement concerns in Europe. On the sales 
side, the location is very favourable for taking advantage 
of low-cost sea transport in bulk to relatively near export 
markets which do not have their own cement industries. All these 
factors permitted a rapid expansion of the Compaq and with 
this the utilization of considerable economies of scale. 
Prices 
An approximate indication of the export prices of cement 
is given in the Annual Trade Reports of the Customs and Excise 
Department of the EACSO. (table III). 
Table Ills Total Value of Exports and Value per Ton 
(in 1000 £ and E.A. Shs, respectively) 
Domestic Exports Interterritorial Exports 
Year. Total Value Value Uganda Value Tanganyika Value 
(1000 £,] ) per ton 
(EA Shs) 
Total Value 
(1000 £ ) 
per ton 
(EA Shs) 
Total Value 
(1000 £) 
per ton 
(EA Shs) 
1958 33 165 85 205 561 189 
1960 207 98 70 182 729 139 
1961 418 89 58 178 681 128 
1962 470 90 99 178 565 112 
1963 503 92 149 177 538 111 
1964 802 94 119 180 764 103 
1965 939 96 68 191 880 100 
S our c e: Annual Trade Reports 
The average ton-price f.o.b. for cement exports outside 
East Africa was 165 shs. in 1958. By 1961, it had been reduced 
to 89 shs. and is since then showing a slow increase. An 
important factor which made these price decreases after 1958 
possible was the introduction of bulk exports by the Bamburi 
factory. Only in this way could the foreign competition on 
the export markets be met. This came mainly from Eastern 
Europe and. often offered its products at very low prices not 
dictated by profit considerations. The export prices of Kenya 
cement to Tanganyika showed a continuous decrease over the whole 
period and were in 1965 only slightly higher than the average 
domestic export prices. The export prices to Uganda, on the 
other hand, were considerably higher during the whole period 
than the prices for cement sales to other countries (except 
for similarly situated countries, like Rwanda and Burundi), 
because the market in Uganda permitted these higher prices. 
The cement prices for local sales are generally higher 
than the export prices, partly because the quantities sold are 
smaller, and only a small part is sold in bulk (under 10$ of 
the total local sales), partly because the higher profits 
made on local sales are used to subsidize certain exports. 
It is not possible to separate the relative weight of both 
factors, but we can take it for granted that the rapid ex-
pansion of the Bamburi factory was assisted by this policy 
which, in turn, allowed economies of scale from which also 
the local market benefitted. The ex-factory prices for local 
sales as per the end of last year were 187/- shs per ton 
at Bamburi and shs 222/- at Athi River. 
Cost Structure of the Industry 
There have "been several studies made on the cement 
industry in different countries where certain indicative rati 
on the structure of cement factories have been calculated^). 
Similarly to the method applied in these studies the cost 
structure has been calculated for the two Kenya factories for 
comparative purposes. 
os 
Table IV: Composition of Unit Cost for Cement Production 
in Selected Countries and Kenya 
(in per cent of total cost) 
Item 
a) 
Germany1' 
(Fed.Rep.) 
U.S.S.R. U.S.A. India Kenya 
Bambu: 
0 Athi River 
Bepreciat. 21. .6 9-.6 22. . 5 13. Q 1 
Wages 8. , 2 22. 3 13. • 9 12. .3 
Fuel 21. ,0 14. ,3 
Power 12. •5> 37. .1 .12. ,6) 34. ,0 
Others 36. .7 31. .0 36. V. ''l , 7 39. ,8 
8.5 
1,3.4-
22.7 
12.8 
37.6 
12.7 
13.9 
19-5 
4.9 
49-0 
aj 
b) 
c) 
Dry process plant with 100,000 tons per year capacity; 
item "others" includes cost for raw materials, packing, 
maintenance, overhead, taxes, interest on fixed capital, 
social security contributions and miscellaneous. 
Includes direct material; 
interest on fixed 
maintenance, overhead, 
, and miscellaneous. capita. 
The figures have been computed as nearly as possible 
to correspond with the figures given for the other 
countries. Real financial costs have been excluded 
and an 8% interest on the 
assets included, 
non-cash wages. 
instead. 
book value 
Item 
of the fixed 
includes 
Sources; United Nations, Studies in Economics of Industry, 
No.l, Cement/Nitrogenous Fertilizer Based on 
Natural Gas, New York 1963, for data o.n India s 
U.N. Economic and Social Council, Economic 
Commission for Africa, Conference on the Harmoni-
zation of Industrial Bevelopment Programmes in 
East Africa, Lusaka, The Cement and Allied-
Industries in the East African Sub-Region, P.46? 
estimates for Kenya on the basis of own 
calculations. 
The main cost items in the cement industry are fuel and 
power, depreciation and wage costs. They take between 50$ and 
70$ of the total costs in all the countries included in the 
comparison. It is not surprising that the cost structure of 
the Kenya plants comes close to the U.S.S.R. and India 
examples with low figures for depreciation and a relatively 
high labour component. This is more pronounced in the case of 
the Bamburi factory which has been until now working entirely 
with shaft kilns which are more labour intensive than rotary 
kilns. A rotary kiln is used by the Athi River Factory. .:The 
relatively high depreciation in Athi River is also due to the 
fact that the factory worked at about 2/3 capacity only, which 
gives more weight to the fixed cost elements i.e. those which 
do not change with output. 
1) see sources of table IV. 
1 
It is interesting to .note "chat the fuel cost of the Bamburi 
plant is relatively more important than that of Athi River 
although Athi River is using the wet process of production which 
requires a higher energy consumption than the dry process 
utilized by the Bamburi plant. In fact, to produce 1 ton of 
cement the Athi River factory requires about 1.3 mill, kcal 
against 980,000 at Bamburi. A disadvantage for Bamburi is that 
it uses imported coal for its fuel requirements which is more 
expensive per unit of energy generated than fuel oil, especially 
after the supply of the South African coal has been interrupted. 
The high incidence of the "other" costs at Athi River may 
very well be partly the result of its unfavorable location with 
regard to raw materials entailing a high amount of transport 
costs. 
Capital Equipment, Labour Force and Out put 
We have mentioned not ore that the degree of capitalization 
is different in the two Kenya cement factories because different 
techniques of production are applied. This has been expressed 
in terms of depreciation on fixed capital as a percentage of 
total cost. We reach the same result if we relate the amount of 
fixed capital invested to capacity. 
By the end of 1965? Bamburi showed an investment in fixed 
assets at cost of Shs 150/-- per ton of capacity against about 
Shs 390/- in Athi River, which is a relation of 1 % 2.6. 
The value of fixed assets per ton cf output differs considerably 
between the two plants not only because of the techniques of 
production arc not the same but also because the two factories 
do not have comparable capacities. The investment cost per unit 
of output decreases in the cement industry with the size of the 
plant. Calculations for other countries show that a cement 
factory with a yearly capacity of 100,000 tons requires an 
investment per unit-,\of output which is about 50$ higher than in 
a 400,000 ton plant^. Erom this point of view, large cement 
plants are more economical especially in countries where capital 
is the scarce factor of production. The Athi River plant has a 
very high fixed capital investment also in relation to comparable 
companies in Europe. The U.N. study e.g. reckons for similar 
plants of a similar size in Germany with a fixed capital 
investment of ca. 206 Shs per ton of capacity^). In 
calculating the capital requirements per unit of capacity one 
further point has to be taken into consideration. It is possible 
that companies with a high amount of capital per unit of capacity 
output show a lesser degree of capitalization if differences in 
the time period of the usage of the fixed assets are .included 
in the comparison. We can do this by relating the annual costs 
of the capital to the capacity output. Capital costs are here 
to be the costs incurred by employing fixed capital assets, i.e. 
mainly depreciation, interest on fixed capital (assumed to be 
a flat rate of 8$ on the book value), insurance premiums for 
fixed capital assets, and costs for repair and maintenance of 
the fixed assets, The ratio cot ween. Bamburi and Athi River is 
also here 1 % 2.5 which confirms our previous statement that the 
Athi River plant is about 2ij- times as capital intensive as the 
Bamburi plant. 
The amount of fixed capital invested per ton of capacity 
output is equal to the average capital/output ratio if a plant 
is working at full capacity. This was true at the end of 1965 of 
~J United Nations, Studies in Economics of Industry, op.cit., 
p.3,.table 2 
2'' ibid, p. 3 
1 
the Bamburi plant.- If we take output in terms of value ex 
factory, we get for Bamburi an average capital/output ratio 
of about 1.5. The Athi Biv er pj_a nt was not working at full 
capacity thus increasing the amount of capital necessary to 
produce one unit of output above the level which could be 
attained at a full capacity production. In other words, the 
Bamburi plant had to employ a smaller amount of fixed capital 
to produce one unit of output and was thus using un scarce factor 
of production, capit a J. m or e e conomically than Athi River. 
If we take output in terms of value, however, the higher 
ex-factory price per tor. of cement at Athi River inflating the 
denominator, of the fraction again lowers the capital/output 
ratio to a value of about 2.4. Por purposes of economic policy 
the concept of the marginal capital/output ratio is more useful 
than the historic average capital/output ratio. It is very 
difficult to get figures for the marginal capital/output ratio 
because it is no fixed figure and changes greatly depending on 
by how much the output is to be increased. We can assume, 
however, that in the case of Athi River, until the factory 
reaches full capacity production, the additional capital for 
the next 30,000 tons of cement p.a. will be minimal and the 
marginal capital/output ratio close to zero. In the case of 
the Bamburi plant an estimate is more difficult to make. 
Additional output will, no doubt, require additional investment 
in plant and machinery which may well be higher - considering 
the rising world market prices for new machinery and the 
change to more capital-intensive rotary kilns - than the 
investment per unit of output in plant and machinery in the 
past. Part of the existing investment in buildings and social 
capital will not have to be extended to the same degree as output 
so that overall the marginal Capital/output ratio will not be 
much higher than the historical average ratio, probably in the 
region of between 1.5 and 2. 
Another way of determining the degree of capital 
intensiveness of an industry is to calculate the capital/labour 
ratio. This is usually expressed in terms of capital invested 
per person employed or per worker directly engaged in production. 
The fixed capital at cost per employee as well as per worker 
directoy engaged in production is more than twice as high at 
Athi River than it is at the Bamburi plant, the absolute values 
being about £ 10,300 to 4,500 and 12,500 £ to 5,000 £, 
respectively. This may be again partly due to the fact that the 
Athi River factory has been working below capacity of its 
physical assets and by enlarging its production to the maximum 
capacity level would employ more labour, but not more capital, 
in this way reducing the amount of fixed capital por head of its 
labour force. But even under the assumption of it working close 
to full capacity its labour force would hardly have to be 
increased by more than 50 persons bringing the total to about 
280 and the per-capita /investment remaining still over 8000 £. 
Let us now turn to the degree of labour utilization in 
the two Kenya cement factories and compare it with figures of 
other countries. 
The efficiency of labour is usually expressed in terms of 
man-hours per unit of output (table V). A comparison between 
different countries shows that especially the Bamburi plant 
has a productivity not much lower than in cement industries of 
economically more advanced countries and higher than in the 
Soviet Union. The productivity of labour of the Athi River plant 
is between 30 and 40$ of .the figure in some of the European 
countries. With only 12$ of the total labour force, the portion 
of the administrative staff is extremely low at Bamburi. 
_ q _ 
Table V; Average Productivity of Labour in the Cement Industry of 
Selected Countries 
(in man-hours per unit of output unless otherwise stated) 
Country Year 
Production Administrative Share of 
and Related and Clerical Total Production & 
Workers Staff Related 
Workers as % 
of total 
77 
85 
85 
84 
82 
83 
Based on December employment. 
Excludes quarrying and includes contract labour. 
The source calls the data "not comparable with other 
countries". 
Erance 1960 1. 83 0. 50 2.33 
Germany . 
(Eed. Rep.) 
Indiab) 
1960a' 1. 76 0.34 2.10 
1956 11. 00 1.90 12.90 
Italy 1960 2. 02 0.36 2.38 
Switzerland 1960 1. 34 0. 25 1.59 
U.S.S.R. 1960 2. 86 0. 50 3.36 
U.S.A. 1960 1, 25 0. 28 1.53 
Kenya \ 
Mamburi1" 
Athi River0^ 
1965 2. 94 0.39 3.33 
1965 4. 89 1.04 5.93 
a) 
b) 
Assumed is that each worker works 2210 hours per year and 
that the Companies produced 406,000 tons and 85?000 tons of 
cement, respectively. 
Sources United Nations, Studies in Economics of Industry, 
op.cit., p.6. for Kenya own calculations. 
This way of mea 
using physical units 
purposes of comparis 
economic development 
taken into account, 
efficiency of labour 
labour in different 
a rough estimate of 
different countries 
suring the physical productiv 
of labour inputs is not quit 
ons between countries in diff 
because variations of labour 
In order to get a better ind 
utilization the diverging pr 
countries should be included, 
the cash-labour costs per ton 
ity of labour by 
e satisfactory for 
erent stages of 
costs are not 
ication about the 
ices of the factor 
Table VI gives 
of cement in 
Table VI shows clearly that the lower productivity of labour -
expressed in man-hours per unit of output - does not automatically 
imply higher labour cost per unit of output. The contrary is the 
case. Bamburi demonstrates a lower total for its labour cost per 
unit of output than even the most efficiently working European firms, 
Also the difference of the Athi River plant to European factories 
is smaller than in table V. Labour costs per unit of output are 
still relatively high due to the high incidence of the expensive 
staff proportion. This is easily to be explained if we consider 
that the number of staff members is usually not fluctuating with 
output within a certain capacity so that Athi River, working at full 
capacity, would certainly have a much lower staff-cost/output ratio 
and probably also a lower workers' - wages/output ratio. 
It has b 
small cement 
Consequently, 
cost for repa 
smaller plant 
cost per ton 
what they are 
We can, there 
ton of cement 
differences i 
een stated above that the fixed capital requirements of 
plants are relatively higher than of large plants, 
the capital costs - depreciation, interest and the 
irs and maintenance - per unit 
s. The same is true for wages 
of cement in a 400,000 t plant 
in a 100,000 t plant1),under 
of output are higher in 
and salaries. Labour 
are less than half of 
ceteris paribus conditions. 
fore, conclude that the differences 
between the two Kenya factories are n size and utilised capacity than of 
in labour cost por 
the result of factors. more othc. 
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An analysis of the labour force of the Kenya Cement 
Industry as to training and experience shows that very little 
differences exist. ±n this respect between the two factories. 
Between 45 and 50$ of the total labour force in both factories 
is classified as unskilled, the remainder being semiskilled and 
skilled including the management staff. Comparative figures 
for other developing countries show a higher portion of unskilled 
workers in the region of 60$ of the total labour force1). This 
discrepancy may be due to differences in definition. A better 
indication about the necessary training and experience in the 
cement industry than the above classification and one which is 
not influenced by often inscidental results of labour 
negotiations is given by a racial breakdown of the labour force. 
The total labour force in the Kenya Cement Industry in 1965 was 
made up to 80 to 85$ of Africans 
and to 15 to 20$ of Asians and Europeans. 
If WG accept the assumption that skilled and highly skilled 
Africans are still the exception rather than the rule^) we can 
say that about 15 to 20$ of the labour force in the Kenya Cement 
Industry belongs in the category of skilled and highly skilled 
personnel and management. 
Future Prospects 
The discussion of the sales of Kenya cement has shown that 
the future development of the industry will be strongly 
influenced by the foreign demand for its products. The domestic 
market will not grow fast enough in the next five years to take 
an appreciably larger share of total production than in the past. 
Table Vis Cash-labour Cost per ton on Cement in selected 
countries (in shs) 
Country Cash-labour cost per ton of cement 
Worker Staff total 
Switzerland 10/70 2/50 13/20 
Germany 
(Fed. Rep.) 14/10 3/40 17/50 
U.S.A. 22/50 6/45 28/95 
Kenya 
Bamburi 7/05 5/60 12/65 
Athi River 11/75 14/85 26/60 
Sources; International Labour Office, Yearbook of Labour 
Statistics 1965, Geneva 1966; own calculations 
for the Kenya plants. For conversion ratios 
(man-hours per ton of cement) turn to table V. 
1 United Nations, op.cit., p.20, table 1 - 1 6 
; This assumption is realistic for the time being only. 
The situation will change as soon as more skilled and 
highly skilled Africans are available on the labour market. 
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The per-capita consumption of cement in Kenya as well as 
in Africa as a whole is still extremely low. Cross-country 
analyses undertaken by the E.G.1.1) suggest that cement 
consumption, is correlated with per-capita incomes and the size 
of the population and that the elasticity of demand for cement 
with respect to income in Kenya between 1961/63 and 1970 will 
fall from 2.40 to 2.01. If we take the average per-capita 
consumption of the years 1961 to 1963 (13.7 kg per head) as 
starting point^) we get the following "normal" consumption path 
for cement in Kenya (table VII); 
United Nations Economic and Social Council, Economic 
Commission for Africa, Conference on the Harminization of 
Industrial Development Programmes in East Africa, Lusaka, 
27 September to 5 October 1965, The Cement and Allied 
Industries in the East African Sub-Region, pp.32 - 34-. 
According to the E.C.A. - report, the elasticity of demand 
for cement with respect to income changes with changes in 
per-capita incomes according to the formula 
e = 126.5/x + 0.8 
where e = elasticity, x = Gross Domestic Product in U.S.$, 
Consequently, we get for Kenya 
in 1961/63 e = 2.40 (x = £ 28.2 = | 78.96) 
1964 e - 2.26 (x = £ 30.9 = $ 86.52) 
1970 e = 2.01 (x = £ 37-4 = &D4.72) 
During these years the boom in the building and construction 
industry of the late 1950's had ceased but had not yet turned 
into the crisis of the two following years. The situation 
in 1961 to 1963 con, therefore, be considered "normal" and 
suitable as starting point for projections 
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during the plan period we can derive the consumption path for 
cement in Kenya (table VIII). These figures are very close to 
those of table VT~ based on the ECA estimates. 
According to both sets of estimates the consumption of 
cement in Kenya will rise until 1970 to about 260,000 to 
270,000 tons. This is an increase of about 75$ over the 
"normal" level in 1964 of table VII and an increase of about 
225$ over the real 1964 level. 
The present capacity of the Kenya cement factories is 
520,000 t per annum. The Bamburi Cement Company is currently 
engaged in an expansion programme which will bring its total 
capacity from 400,000 t p.a. to 700,000 p.a. by 1968. The total 
capacity of both the Kenya cement factories by 1969 will then be 
820,000 t p.a. This means that in 1969 there will be a surplus 
capacity of about 570,000 t and in 1970 of about 560,000 t for 
exports. Exports in 1965 were of the order of 380,000 tons over 
45$ of which went to Tanganyika. With the new plant at 
Bar Es Salaam it can be expected that this market will be lost 
for the Kenya producers before the end of this decade. 
Table VIII; Consumption Path of Cement in Kenya on the Basis of 
Projected Gross Eixed Capital Formation During the 
Years 1965/66 and 1969/701) 
Item 1965/66 1966/67 1967/68 1968/69 1969/70 
£ mill. £ mill. £ mill. £ mill. £ mill. 
I. Projected Gros 
Capital Formation, tot. 42. 0 63-• 3 66. ,1 71. 8 81 = ,1 
in;Agriculture & Lifest. 6. 5 10. ,2 9. • 9 9-9 11. , 6 
Non-Agric. Private 
Investment 19- 2 30. ,2 32. . 4 3.5-5 40. ,0 
E. A . C. S. 0. 5-0 6. ,1 3. ,4 3. 3 5. ,0 
Other Public Inv't 11. 3 16. ,8 20. . 4 23. 1 24. • 5 
II.Projected Gross Inv't 
in Building & Constr., 
total 23. 4 35. ,2 38. ,0 41. .6 46. A ' *T 
intAgric. & Lifestock 
(60$ of total)2) 3. 9 6. ,1 5-.9 5. • 9 7. ,0 
Non-Agric. Private 
Investment 9\ 
(42.5$ of total) 8. 2 12. .8 13. ,8 15. ,1 17. .0 
E.A.C.S.O. 
(36.6$ of total) ' 1. 8 2. .2 1. , 2 1. ,2 1. ,8 
Other Public Inv't 9. 5 14. , i 17. .1 19. A ' t 20. ,6 
III. Cement Consumption 1000 t 1000 t 1000 t 1000 t 1000 t 
(Divisor 182.7) 128 198 208 228 254 
Parts I. and II. of the table are preparatory in the 
sense that they serve to calculate the annual projected 
gross investment in building and construction. The 
figures under I. are, after rearranging them, taken 
over from table 11 of the Plan. The figures under II 
are derived from the annual averages during the Plan 
period of column 1 of table 10 of the Plan. It was 
necessary to go back to this sectoral breakdown because 
the estimated expenditures for building and construction 
are only given as annual averages and not for each year 
of the Plan period. The percentages under part II. are 
calculated on the basis of these averages and are 
assumed to remain constant in each year. 
"of total" means of total projected gross investment 
in this sector. 
Source; Development Plan 1966-1970, pp.113-114 
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By "then? ii' b'he Kenya plants are to 'work at full 
capacity,' new export markets outside East Africa for a surplus 
of about 350,000 t will have to be found, and about two thirds 
of total production will have to be exported, which is about 
the same export ratio as during the years 1961 to 1963 but 
lower than in 1964 and 1965- Whether or not this high rate of 
exports can be achieved depends on the development of demand 
for cement and the economic policies in the major export markets 
outside East Africa questions to examine is outside the scope 
of this paper. 

